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Abstract 
This research paper aims to unveil the interests and policies of Pakistan towards Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
with an emphasis on the role of military and bureaucratic elite It is believed that these two elites are the real 
movers and shakers of Pakistan’s foreign policy.  During this period the strategic and economic interests 
intertwined with each other.  The role of Military and Civilian bureaucracy appears at two levels. First, the role 
of Civilian bureaucracy is more visible under the patronage of Naseer Ullah Baber, the then interior minister. He 
in pursuit of exploiting economic opportunities wanted peace and stability in Afghanistan.  Second, The Military 
and ISI, which had always been under the control of policy and operational involvement into Afghanistan since 
long, were first not clear on Taliban. Soon realizing the significance of Taliban’s victories, it decided to shed off 
the burden of its traditional allies and instruments, Gulbadin Hikmat Yar and Abdul Rashid Dostam. The 
research reveals that no regular army units were directly involved at operational level. Some Ex ISI officers or 
soldiers in their personal capacity might have fought along with Taliban against Northern Alliance. The 
circumstantial evidences prove that Pakistan did not stop the crossing of armed students from Pakistani religious 
Madrassa. This can be termed as to be a practical help on the part of Pakistan’s regular Armed Forces.  
Key words: Afghanistan, Taliban, economic and strategic interests , Governing Elite, Military Elite, 
Bureaucratic Elite, Naser-Ullah Babar,  
Introduction 
There has always been a thrust in the Political Scientists and International Relations theorists to locate 
actual wielders of political power and their influence on public policy making.  So this   led towards an increased 
and monumental interest in the enquiry of decisions as focal point. The focus of political scientists was to 
analyze the decision makers in a given political system and the decisional behavior of voters, legislators, 
executives, officials, politicians, leaders of the interests groups and other actors simultaneously. They were 
actually inclined to look into and locate the actual decision makers, entrusted with a task to authoritatively 
allocate values within a society. While theorists of international relations earlier had been directed towards the 
analysis of the only political activities of state across boundaries, without considering that ‘Who’ is behind the 
activities of an abstract entity i.e. state, formulated and then manifested through the foreign policy.  
However, this seems very difficult at broader national level to analyze the context of decisions, the 
nature of leadership and the stability and regularity of decision-making process. Parry has reinforced that “any 
decisions taken at national level have large ramification. He, besides pinpointing the expensiveness of the 
research project has mentioned some problems in this regards. He talked about the limitedness of accessibility to 
decision makers. In case, access becomes possible then according to him:  
The political scientist is often prevented on grounds of national interests or on grounds of 
official secrecy from publishing his results and his sources in full. This renders very difficult 
the task of assessment and criticism by the academic world, and the public to whom the analyst 
is under an obligation to present his researches. To the extent his work is censored that student 
is in danger of offering an apologia for the status quo. (p.60) 
Who are decision makers in Pakistan?  
 Ever since the sociologists and social scientists have forged discussion on the organization of society, 
the issue of governing elite has been the primary focus of their study. In general, the term elite stand for a small 
minority to play an exceptionally influential role in the political and social affairs.  
The people who occupy the command positions with a capacity to take binding decisions for the society 
are interchangeably termed as Governing Elite, Power Elite or Decision makers. The concept of ruling class or 
governing elite varies from country to country owing to their peculiar historical experiences and societal fabric, 
as in the case of Pakistan, its political system is inherently elitist one.  
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 The phenomenon of real decision makers in Pakistan have been delineated  by multifarious dimensions, 
but broadly there is a consensus among analysts that colonial institutional - structural legacy provided the 
foundation stone for evolving Governing Elite in Pakistan. The steel frame of British reign were of two 
institutions; The Civil Service and Military, continued and nurtured in Pakistan’s post partition favorable 
circumstances with  the same characteristic features. Ayesha Siddiqa focusing upon the core question, ‘who is 
Pakistan’s Elite’  besides indicating towards other groups mainly pointed towards the primacy of Civil and 
Military bureaucracy as being the fountain of political power in the history of Pakistan.(Siddiqa ,Ayesha, Who is 
this Elite, The Express Tribune , Retrieved: tribune.com.pk/story/…/Who is This Elite ).So politics in Pakistan 
was overwhelmed by two non-political elites - the military- bureaucratic elite, however intercepted with the short 
interregnum of democratic rule of politically elected civilians with lesser degree of influence. An astute scholar 
Ian Talbot comment, “The Army and bureaucracy have been the self- appointed guardians of the Pakistani state 
since independence. Political parties and constitutions have come and gone or been transformed but these twin 
unelected institutions have remained the pillars of state (2000, p. 215). So, contrary to all standardized rules of 
game of parliamentary democracy, politics has remained the dominion of military and bureaucratic elites 
because of their capacity of creeping invasion into political sphere.  
 Generally in developing countries, democracies return either because of the popular pressure or a 
Army’s desire to maintain its professionalism and sometimes due to the   transformation of the “ruling military 
elite into a de-facto civilian regime by the progressive reduction of manifest military support conscious 
civilianization of the top military elite” (Charles, L. Cochran :1974, p.74.) Pakistan is no exception. Here we 
need to address a pertinent question that what was the common thread between Military and Bureaucratic elite. 
In Pakistan as Ayesha Jalal (1990) states that the domestic, regional and international factors actually 
instrumented in the dominance of the civil bureaucracy and the military right after the independence. Besides 
these factors, the similar mindset of both elite groups on the issues of democracy, modernity, religion, 
strengthened their position in power structure.   They considered Pakistani a naïve and simple people, 
unprepared to be governed by on the model Westminster type democracy, as in the words of Major General 
Iskandar Mirza  
 Democracy required education, tradition, and pride in your ability to do something, unless by 
condemning to ruthless struggle for power corruption, the shameful exploitation of our simple, 
honest, patriotic and industrious masses (Waseem, Muhammad, 1994, p. 157)  
 He actually showed his distrust in the ability of common Pakistani to enjoy the self- rule. Likewise, 
General Ayub Khan had the same trust deficit when he said: “My task, as I saw to set up institution which should 
enable people of Pakistan to develop their material, moral, and intellectual resources and capacities to the 
maximum extent”(ibid) 
 The same mode of thinking prevails among the CSPs, and almost every one of them has a 
comprehensive, extensive and self-sufficient formula for the salvation of the nation. Nevertheless, one cannot 
claim a complete harmony in outlook and attitude in both elite groups. At some of` time there has  been a sort of 
distrust and mutual suspicions, but easily mediated owing to  a sort of  balance in  power structure  and that the 
top level occupant of position in the institutions shared the same social class, pride in professionalism and same 
sources of norms, derived from colonial legacy. “Both had pretension to being liberal, utilitarian, and modern. 
Both liked associating with foreigners, no less than with capitalists , both were pro-western, pro-Islamic, pro-
order, pro-development pro-guided democracy, proprietors, both anti –politicians, anti-mullahs ,and anti- 
communists. (Eqbal Ahmed, pp.51-52:19-23) 
The colonial legacy of institutional structure of Pakistan had continued in terms of recruitment and 
power, simultaneously, enhanced its influence in all sphere of governance including foreign policy making 
decisions. 
 Pakistan never entangled militarily with Afghanistan despite its irredentist claims on some of parts of 
Pakhtun populated areas in NWFP(KPK), Baluchistan and FATA and its hostile attitude. Since inception, 
Afghanistan has always remained high at the helm of affairs of Pakistan security apparatus; side-by-side 
bolstered the power and positions of military elite into state’s internal and external policies. Khalid Bin 
Sayeed analyzing elites’ retrospectively commented that during the initial years, due to powerful personalities of 
Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, the entire administration and politicians remained subservient to the 
central government, which had largely been, at that time, commanded by civil- bureaucratic elite. However, very 
soon the changing scenario of international politics and growing needs to cater with the compulsions of fragile 
security environment in 50’s, Pakistan Army became the dominant player in decision making process, 
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specifically, when C-in-C Ayub Khan in contradiction to all democratic and parliamentary norms became, in 
uniform, the defense minister in the 1953-54’s civilian cabinet. With the passage of time, the Army became   the 
ultimate guarantor of the state integrity. In addition, during the Zia regime, it attained the position to secure the 
ideological identity of Pakistan as well. (Talbot , Ian , Does Army shape Pakistan’s foreign policy,2002,p.322) 
.The dominance of military establishment is undeniable fact during direct rule but the military elite  also kept in 
its hand the strings of foreign and defense policies specifically the issues related to India and Afghanistan even 
during the civilian governments. (Waseem, Muhammad, 2009, p. 183)Then how could, Pakistan’s policy 
towards Taliban regime, be remained beyond the influence of military elite, and civil bureaucratic elite as the 
junior partner. Their perception, motivation and operational involvement fully capitalized Pakistan’s policy 
towards Taliban regime during 1996-2001. 
Interests and Policy of Pakistan and Taliban Regime  
 The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan had been evaluated under vast arrays of opinions and perspectives. 
Nevertheless, before analyzing the reasons and causes of emergence of Taliban, and subsequent role of Military 
Civil bureaucratic elite in supporting them, there is a need to understand the re -innovated policy parameters and 
redefined interests of Pakistan in the changed post-cold war political environment. With the end of cold war, 
though there had not been any formal ceremonies, the United States and its Western allies stood winner. This 
victory unleashed massive geo-political changes at all levels i.e. national, regional and international. These 
changes included the dominance of western value system, the emergence of Central Asian states etc. South 
Asia’s complex security system received all the shockwaves of these changes. So this led Pakistan to re-innovate 
its policies, objectives, and ways to avail new opportunities and face new challenges as well.  However, 
Economic objectives and security needs retained their primacy intact. Rather in this changed environment, the 
strategic and economic interests closely intertwined with each other.  
 Strategic Interests  
 The coincidence of economic opportunities interweaving with security and strategic objectives in the 
region happened due to circumstances emerging out of Central Asian Republics’ independence. These States 
possess vast natural resources.  Pakistan is ideally positioned to transport oil and gas reserves of Central Asian 
States to the world. Pakistan can provide both sea and land links. These links comprised three routes i.e. via 
Afghanistan and through China and Gawadar, which is the easiest sea route for Central Asian states. This was 
presumed that “the CARS had sharpened the geo-political, geo-economic and geo- strategic potentialities of 
Pakistan”. (Alam, Muhammad, Munir, 2004, p.120). Pakistan’s policy in general towards Afghanistan had been 
fully under the shadow of two objectives: 
First:   Traditional component of military’ strategic outlook of securing Strategic depth viz –a-viz 
India,  
Second  Refreshed economic perspective of opening trade routes with Central Asia 
 These two objectives then shaped Pakistan’s policy towards Taliban regime .i.e. To have a pro- 
Pakistan Pliable Government in Afghanistan  
 The strategic depth notion had also been, historically employed by British Empire under the rubric of 
the ‘Deep Defence` and ‘Forward Policy’ for North Western Borders of British India (Barun, De, 2002,p. 3814. 
). President Ayub Khan also believed that the natural defense line for the sub-continent was the Hindu Kush, 
(Hussain, Rizwan, 2005,p. 182).  
 Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 revived this historic Strategic outlook of erstwhile British 
Empire for Pakistan, enlivened with constant threats from Eastern Border i.e India. So the refreshed strategic 
depth theory echoed in the security establishment’s strategic outlook (Roy, Olivier, 2002, in Christopher Jafferlot 
(edt),p. 151). Pakistan’s geographical lacuna in terms of its configuration (narrow in width) warranted to be dealt 
strategically, so military strategists suggested it to be dealt comfortably by having a pliable client regime in 
Afghanistan. Mirza Aslam Beg clearly worded this notion, which stressed the need for a dispersal of Pakistan 
military personnel and assets in Afghanistan well beyond the offensive capability of the India’s military. The ISI, 
as observed by Rizwan Hussain (2005,p. 190) that the Pakistan intelligence agencies apparatus is controlled by 
the military elite with a definite chain of command also share the views regarding strategic lacuna of the county 
with military elite.  
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




 General Hamid Gul ex Director General Inter-Services Intelligence 1987-1989, had firm belief that 
strategic depth was a security compulsion for Pakistan. Because, it has a very large population on its borders and 
a friendly Afghanistan at backyard would rectify strategic lacuna. Therefore, it was presumed a compulsion for 
Pakistan to support Taliban. (Ahmed,Naseem , 2001, p. 206, Unpublished thesis) Pakistan’s geographical 
configuration makes it a highly vulnerable country from security point of view. All its major cities are located on 
borders either of India or Afghanistan. ( Rizvi,Mujtaba ,1998,p. 184).  
As shown in the following map. 
 
Figure 6.1 Map of Administrative Division Showing Geographical Configuration 
Source: http://www.globalcitymap.com/pakistan/images/pakistan-political-map.gif, Dated:12-7-2012  
 
Afghanistan’s denial of Durand Line led all Afghan rulers to promote Pashtun nationalism among the 
Pashtun population of KPK, Baluchistan and FATA areas. Pakistan in order to meet this challenge at its western 
border adopted two pronged policy. First, to keep calm at Afghan border, established cordial links by providing 
trade facilities. Secondly, to cultivate relations with Pushtun Islamists believing that their Islamic identity would 
ultimately dilute Pashtun ethnic identity between the Pashtun living on both sides of Durand line. Pakistan’s 
Military has always been characterized by the presence of Pushtuns at decision making level with a belief that 
chosen Pushtun Islamists forces would  always  be in friendly posture towards Pakistan on assuming power.  The 
rise of Pahstun force in the guise of Taliban from Pashtun populated Southern Afghanistan was considered 
another opportunity to install a Pro –Pakistan Pashtun Islamic government in Afghanistan to provide Strategic 
Depth vis- a- vis Hindu India.   
Economic Perspective  
The strategic depth was not confined only to the security compulsions, it also entailed economic 
dimension. Especially the end of cold war brought this dimension forefront more clearly for states of South 
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Asian region. This actually happened because of South Asian’s vicinity to the newly emergent central Asian 
republics. Pakistan hurried in to exploit all economic opportunities. Pakistan’s policy makers conceived 
Afghanistan’s geographic proximity to the Central Asian states to be the most advantageous factor in the 
changed geo-political scenario. The territory of Afghanistan could be used as the transit route for the Central 
Asian oil and gas supplies, supplanting the pipelines running though Russian territories. Therefore, Afghanistan 
emerged as the most plausible link for Pakistan to establish trade relations with Central Asian states. “Pakistan 
has since then sought to open a corridor to that region through Afghanistan” (Tarock, Adam, 1999, p. 808) Marvi 
Memon (1998) has opined that “Pakistan needs Kabul as a route; the western route via Iran is too long and 
eastern route via China is mountainous. Thus if it wants influence in the Central Asian states, then peace is 
necessary in Afghanistan.” (Memon, Marvi,1998,p. 411). Hence, a pipeline was proposed to be constructed from 
Turkmenistan to Multan with a cost of 2 billion dollar, by an international consortium (CENTAGAS) but could 
not materialize due to Afghanistan situation. (Gidadhubli, R.G, 1999, p. 262)  
 
Figure 6.2: Route of TAPI (projected) 
Besides obvious economic and commercial interests (Ferdinand, peter, 1994,pp. 86-87) in developing 
bi-lateral trade in raw material manufacturing goods, opening up communications links, Pakistan’s policy 
makers  wanted  a “Muslim security belt  stretching from Turkey to Pakistan with Central Asia  as the buckle” to 
provide strategic depth” (Smith, L. Dianne. 1996,p.165). The strategic linkages between Central West and South 
are also found in history and well entrenched with political diplomatic and commercial ties. As it has also been 
found by Rajesh Basrur (1996-97:5) that the rise of Mogul power brought all three regions into one security 
complex.  
 Pakistan strategists presumed that the combination of Turkish- Persian- Uzbeks in an alliance form 
could successfully be waged in post- Soviet international word order as Islamic security complex. This strategic 
setting presumed to be materialized due to Central Asian states, which could provide the strategic hinterland. 
Central Asian states, during the initial years, were moving on the same lines, as they quickly joined ECO and 
OIC. Ahmed Rashid had the same opinion that expanding ties with the Muslim Heartland of Asia can fulfill 
Pakistan’s military aspiration for strategic depth. He also hailed the possibility of joining the regional 
arrangements in Asia (Rashid, Ahmad, Seizing a Historic Opportunity, Dawn, January, 15, 1999)  
 Pakistan celebrated the joining of OIC and ECO by CARS as the re-unification of three Asia. It is like 
long lost brothers meeting once again and embracing deep. To successfully achieve all these objectives Pakistan 
needed a peaceful, politically aligned Afghanistan because “Pakistan’s rail lines currently end at the Afghanistan 
border, (Dianne, L. Smith, 1996, p. 156).  
 What role military and civil bureaucratic elite in achieving these well conversant geo-political 
objectives had played? This is now being analyzed.   
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The Role of Military and Civil Bureaucratic Elite: 1993-1996 
 
In 1993, the political fiasco once again marred the system stability in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif being in 
power performed vigilantly during the early years from domestic to foreign policy areas. Largely Islamic parties 
applauded his major policy changes. (Tikker, Manesha, 2004, p. 196). Soon the deluge of differences and 
complaints between Prime Minister and President turned everything upside down. President once again invoked 
the eighth amendment, the subsequent event was quite apparent that Prime Minister had to relinquish power. 
Though not having any such precedent, judiciary re-instated him for a while. However, the political debacle 
crippled down the political process completely and both P.M and President had to tender their resignation.  Moen 
Quershi after a short interregnum in Prime Minister House held general elections on Oct 6, 1993. The results of 
election moved Benazir Bhutto into PM House with a confidant Farooq Leghari in President House.  
 Despite the democratic rule before and after fresh elections in 1993, military’s creeping invasions into 
real politics did not end.  Specifically, Afghan and Kashmir continued to be in the orbit of influence of military 
and ISI. However, this time Benazir came in power with somewhat   improved patterns of relationship with 
military establishment. She had been in good terms with General Abdul Waheed Kakar COAS. In full realization 
that she had to keep the Pakistan Army happy, and accommodate the demands of Army and ISI but at the same 
time, she was also desirous of keeping control over the unbridled force of ISI.  (Coll, Steve, 2004, p. 289) In that 
particular point of time in 1993, ISI was passing through a systemic change. General Abdul Waheed Kakar due 
to violations of channels of command changed two ISI chiefs Lt General Asad Durrani and Lt General Javed 
Nasir one after another.  
 The new ISI chief with the consent of General Abdul Waheed Kakar initiated a restructuring process 
and cleansing of ISI from Islamists. He also   tightened the belt around Jihadis in Kashmir. So following this 
policy, many officers in ISI either repatriated or retired. (Abbas Hassan, 2005, p. 153) This enhanced Benazir’s 
control over Afghan policy and bolstered her position viz-a-viz troika. However, broadly Benazir Bhutto 
continued to commensurate military guideline for foreign policy of the country. (Talbot, Ian, 2002).To say that 
ISI was completely purged would be too naïve and simplistic in approach. 
 Before Benazir’s entry into Power, Pakistan, since long has been supporting Gulbadin Hikmat  yar in 
the hope that he, with the help of other Islamists- Pashtun groups, would install a pro-Pakistan’s government. 
This hope could not materialize despite all conciliatory efforts undertaken by Pakistan by mediating Peshawar 
and Islamabad Accords. Rather as observed by Angelo Ranasayaam (2003) that he became a diplomatic burden 
because of his heavy bombardment over the Population of Kabul and annoyance of Tehran, which threatened to 
go for military solution to prevent Pakistan from attempts of installing a Pro Pakistan government at Kabul by 
supporting Gulbadin Hikmatyar. Benazir government seriously addressed the threat and Naseer Ullah Baber 
requested her to make him in charge of Afghan policy. He said as quoted in Angelo Raanasayam (2003) “I will 
see to it that Iran is neutralized in Afghanistan” (p. 147) 
  The internecine fighting and Mujahedeen’s internal conflicts damaged Pakistan’s interest in bringing 
peace and stability in Afghanistan and having a pliable friendly government at Kabul (Rais, Rasul Baksh, 1993, 
p. 912). At this juncture of history, Benazir Bhutto, in her second term with hopes to re-innovate the Afghan 
policy showed her intentions to rebuff the old cannons specifically Hikmat Yar. This time she wanted to market 
internationally the cross roads of the old silk road of the trade between Europe and Asia (Coll, Steve, 2004, p. 
290). Benazir was in full belief in 1993-94, not to ignore political chaos and instability in Afghanistan.  Because, 
History taught her that almost all ancient conquests had been the consequents of inspirations based on trade 
routes that ran from Central Asia to Delhi.  
 Therefore, a must barrier to re-define the interests and policies towards Central Asia was Afghanistan. 
Afghan policy, carved out by Benazir Government, was taken as an entrée to forming trade links with Central 
Asia and regional realignment. Benazir Bhutto and her advisors had no intention to bypass or rebuke the role of 
military elite or its most potent instrument ‘ISI’. Naseer-Ullah Baber arranged a consultation meeting with 
concerned military senior people of ISI’s Afghan Bureau. They were of the opinion that Pakistan should 
continue its policy of supporting Pushtoon Islamists, specifically Gulbadin Hikmat Yar on the pretext that if 
Tajiks and Uzbeks prolonged their control over Kabul, they might be used by India for ethnic secessionism in the 
large Pushtoon population of Pakistan (Coll, Steve 2004: 192). This experienced opinion made clear that 
alternate to Pashtun protégé must be a Pashtun political force. Besides it in 1994, the Army Chief General Abdul 
Waheed Kakar and ISI Head General Ali Quli Khan were both Pashtuns similarly Most of the ISI officers 
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involved in strategic planning and intelligence gathering, since long, was Pashtuns, inherently inclined towards 
their Pushtuns kins. 
Benazir Bhutto was fully determined to establish trade links with Central Asian states. Therefore, the 
first prominent initiative undertaken by Naseer- ullah-Baber in pursuance of this policy objective was his 
decision to go to Central Asian states by land, along with Hidatullah Khan Niazi, Director –General of Pakistan, 
National High Way Authority. This was fifteen days visit through Afghanistan, Central Asian States and China 
and meant to assess possibility of opening up trade with the CARS via Kandahar and Herat. (Matinuddin, 
Kamal, 1999, p. 63) On 20 October1994, he went  to Herat with a delegation comprising ambassadors from UK, 
USA, Spain, Italy, China and South Korea, senior Pakistani officials from railways, highways telephone. This 
was meant to unfold the plethora of opportunities and attract investment of at least $300 Million to build 
highway from Quetta to Kandahar and $800 million for construction of Railway track and Satellite system to 
link at least 100 towns (Rashid, Ahmed. (1998). Pakistan and the Taliban, the Nation, April 11) Benazir Bhutto 
also went to Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan on 28 October 1994, where she met Ismail Khan and Abdul Rashid 
Dostam. This aimed to secure the help of governor of Herat, which was comparatively at that time peaceful and 
prosperous region under the efficient administration of Ismail Khan. He promised his help provided Pakistan 
could manage security of Herat Road by marginalizing the warlords control in Southern Afghanistan, especially 
in and around Kandahar. (Angelo Raanasayaam, 2003 , p. 147) Another convoy was arranged with 30 trucks 
carrying Pakistani goods for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with a purpose to bypass Kabul in October 1994. 
Babar asked Benazir Bhutto “Why do we need Kabul anyway, (Coll. Steve, 2004, p. 290). The Southern route 
through Kandahar and Herat appeared as the most plausible way to establish trade links with Central Asia. 
 This initiative coincided with Taliban’s overture along this route. Similarly another unusual 
concurrence also took place in the same period, which had also great ramification for the rise of Taliban 
movement, this was the role of Truck Mafia based in Chaman and Quetta, who were looking for a unifying 
force, which could effectively arrange for their business free of any hazards. They were ready to pay heavy 
amount for this purpose happily. (Jacob, Happymon, 2006, p. 34) In March 1995, Taliban collected Rs 6 Million 
from Truck transporters. (Rashid, Ahmed. (1998). Pakistan and the Taliban, the Nation, April 11) 
 There are multiple opinions about Pakistan’s role in the rise of Taliban to prominence. Larry Goodson 
(2001) has identified some factors, which include Pakhtun identity, religious piety of Taliban leaders, and the 
war weariness of Afghan people, the money, and lastly Pakistan involvement. He has observed that “Support for 
the Taliban within Pakistan government, army, and society is deep and multifaceted. Indeed, it is not incorrect to 
say that the Taliban’s are Pakistanis”. (pp, 109-111) Daniel S.P. Sullivan looking at the causes and reasons of the 
rise of the Taliban viewed it as a fuel necessary to spread the fire. That means the initiation of Taliban movement 
was not due to Pakistan. Because according to him, the initial support was neither overt nor unified. Dorronso 
assumed that the emergence of Taliban is itself a byproduct of changing position of Ulema in Afghan Society. In 
the twentieth century, Ulema started taking part in politics because of discontentment over the modernization of 
society. From 1924 to 1971, Ulema successfully mobilized masses on different occasions, which show their 
social significance in the Afghan society. During the Afghan war, Ulema generally commanded at local level 
their respective students against Soviets. Due to this background, it was easy for Mullah Umer to gather his 
students and mobilize the way he wanted. 
It has also been assumed that Taliban were the corollary of the Pakistani policy during post Najib Ullah 
period. Pakistan wanted from International community to withdraw their recognition of Rabbani Government on 
the basis that after 28 June 1994 Rabbani Government had lost its legitimacy because of non-compliance of 
March and April agreements. The growing friction between Pakistan and closeness of Rabhani government to 
India and Iran threatened Pakistan to be a final looser despite putting decades long efforts to have a pliable 
friendly government at Kabul (Magnus, Ralph, 1997,p. 115). Generally Pakistan’s analysts proceeded with the 
viewpoint that Pakistan had not initiated in any way the Taliban uprising. Colonel Imam, Raheem Ullah and 
Hamid Gul had the same opinion.  
 The late Colonel Imam in an interview claimed that Pakistan ISI had no information about the rising of 
Taliban until the end of 1994. (Interview with Ifthikhar Ahmed at Geo News dated September 2009). Similarly, 
Ahmed Rashid has also observed that ISI, which had been in control of both operational and policymaking for 
Afghan Affairs was initially skeptical about their chances of success. (Rashid, Ahmed, 2000,p. 188).Therefore, 
the exponent of this viewpoint that Pakistan had been involved in the initiation of this Taliban surge could not 
present any circumstantial evidence in this regard. Sometimes Taliban’s protection to a Pakistani Truck convoy 
in Oct 1994 and the Chamman Truck Mafia support in the same period are furnished as evidence. Still no one 
can categorically claim that Pakistan managed this protection. “Any possibility of transporting  regular troops, 
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disguised Taliban or the Krates of Kalashnikov mortars, and other assorted firepower needed to capture a city 
blistering with hard bitten  fighters sounded whimsy” (Griffin, Michael, 2001, p. 37).Though, the events and 
circumstances surrounding this convoy had acute relevance with later events concerning Taliban’s swift victory. 
National Logistics Cell organized under the command of Major Jehangir a Truck convoy. Late Colonel Imam 
who was the first head of the Pakistani mission at Herat joined this caravan at the point of Spin Boldak. This 
caravan could not make its way safely as stopped by a local commander, when it was just twenty-five kilometers 
away from Kandahar. The local commanders Mansoor Amir Lali, Ustad Alam  Saraktib stopped this convoy 
with a view to mount a pressure to stop the joining of madrasa students to the rising Taliban force. This force, 
began with 30 Taliban, by the end of Oct of same year 1994 touched the number of 1500, which was 
unavoidable. When colonel Imam, by his own means trying to rescue the convoy and negotiating the local 
commanders, Mullah Borjan, a Taliban leader contacted him and offered to rescue the convoy. Colonel Imam 
accepted the offer. The task of rescuing the convoy successfully accomplished with the force of 200 hundred 
Taliban on 4 November 1994.  
 This act of bravery endeared Taliban to Pakistan’s military and civil bureaucracy  taking them as a most 
viable available option to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan and make possible the free movement along 
the Chaman -Kandhar Highway. On the next day of rescuing the Pakistan’s convoy, Kandhar siege took place by 
the hands of Taliban.  Sullivan, Daniel. P. has commented that (2007) “Kandahar victory was possible just 
because that Pakistan had paid off a commander in Kandahar to make it easier for the Taliban to take the city. (P. 
105)  
 Before Pakistan could capitalize their support to Taliban meaningfully, the Transport Mafia, the Drug 
trafficker and war weariness of common man started pouring in money to Taliban movement. The donations 
from business people was made  to clear the roads for carrying goods safe from bandits, money for the sake of 
God (Mullah Zaeef, 2010, 67).  
 Pakistan formalized its support to Taliban by 1995. Since Nov 5, of Kandahar fall out, Taliban kept on 
advancing, and by the end of February, they were in control of seven provinces. Colonel Imam is considered to 
have been, at that time, the main conduit for Arms and Money to Taliban. He is as believed with other ISI 
officers to have managed to buy the loyalties of local commanders for Taliban (Hussain, Zahid, 2010, p. 29).  
  Taliban has mainly emerged from Pushtun ethnic areas, so this benefitted them a lot because of 
Pushtoon elements in Pakistan military, and civil bureaucracy had strong affiliations with their Pushtoon 
Kinsmen in Afghanistan (Hussain, Rizwan, p. 182). Olivier Roy (2002) pointing out towards the significance of 
Pushtoon elements observed that because of failure of Gulbadin HikmatYar, to force out  the Tajik Ahmad Shah 
Masood and Rabbhani Alliance from Kabul “Pakistan had to find another Afghan fundamentalist pakhtoon 
card”. (p. 152). Though, No credible evidence endorsed the involvement of Pakistan in the creation of Taliban, 
but sign of co-operation since its rise were quite visible and persuasive to lead to the belief  of Rabbani regime  
that all victories and advances done by the Taliban were  the outcome of Pakistan’s active military support. He 
complained that Pakistan had not been taking notice or barring the illegal crossing of flock of armed men. 
Rabbani appealed to international community for the arrangements of monitoring of international border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Fange, Andres, 1995, p. 23) 
 A US embassy cable has also mentioned about the alleged involvement of ISI and Pakistan’s Air Force 
officers (The Taliban file 1994, P 1). However, in an interview a retired ISI officer keeping his anonymity 
claimed that these were all speculations, that any regular forces were involved in any way with Taliban as 
fighters. At the same time, he opined that there is very much possibility that some ex ISI men due to their 
personal contacts, established during Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union, might have remained involved. 
William Maley(1996) quoted the former Pakistani General  Mirza Aslam Beg,that “ their origin is in Pakistan , 
their bases are in Pakistan”. He also mentioned that a BBC correspondent in Kabul reported that aid workers had 
recognized the Pakistani army within the Taliban occupation force.( P.276) 
 Sardar Asif Ali, Foreign Minister of Pakistan had an exchange of views with Taliban in Kandahar, in 
which, he reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to Afghanistan territorial integrity. (Dawn, August, 6 1995) This 
meeting took place between a foreign minister and a non-recognized political force of Afghanistan. Pakistan 
initial support was a competition between Army and civilian leadership gaining influence within Pakistan 
government as regards Afghan policy. Because there was distrust between prime minister Bhutto and ISI 
(Sullivan, Daniel P, 104). This viewpoint is also present in one of the US cable, which stated. “The burgeoning 
Taliban movement is being directly supported by Pakistan. The interior minister is the chief patron of the 
Taliban” while DG ISI had been quoted as that he had strongly recommended to PM Bhutto that GOP not 
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support the Taliban in any way Taliban could become dangerous and uncontrollable which could harm both 
Afghanistan and potentially Pakistan (The Taliban file NSA Document No: 1994: 11584 p. 2).  
 The historic city of Herat was captured on September 5, 1995, and the next day Pakistan embassy at 
Kabul was burnt down, killing one employee and one wounded left behind. This incident further deteriorated the 
already tensed relations between Pakistan and Rabbani regime. These two incidents also made ISI to re-orient its 
policy outlook of supporting Gulbadin Hikmat Yar who had, by that time proved a complete failure.  Pakistan 
and Rabbani regime were entangled in war of words over the issue of Pakistan involvement, as PM Benazir 
Bhutto in a meeting with senator Hank Brown and Charlie Wilson clarified Pakistan’s position in this regard. 
(The Taliban File, Document ID, 200314, April, 1996) Rabbani’s deputy F.M in UN Assembly blamed Pakistan 
for being the source of financial and logistical means, making Taliban’s swift advances, and victories possible. 
He gave statistical analysis in his speech and insisted that Pakistan gave 88 million dollars and 15000 gallons 
fuel besides providing fighters.  
 To substantiate their claim Rabbani official produced the captured Pakistanis fighting for Taliban in 
Afghanistan. (Dawn, Jan 27, 1995) After the embassy attack on 6th September at Kabul, there was a cutoff at 
diplomatic level between Pakistan and Rabbani regime. However, after a while, the situation improved. 
Afghanistan’s officials apologized and agreed to pay handsome money for the construction of embassy in 
compensation (Dawn, February 17, 1996) 
 In the meantime, Afghan imbroglio worsened further.  The fighting in and around Kabul between 
Ahmed Shah Masud and Gulbadin Hikmat Yar intensified. Taliban’s march was unimpeded; finally, the day 
came when they made their way into Kabul victoriously. Benazir called it a welcome development. Pakistan, 
finally officially abandoned its long cherished policy of supporting Gulhadin Hikmatyar, but once again the 
chosen instruments were Pushtoon elements to accomplish the long awaited task of establishing a pro-Pakistani 
government in Kabul to secure strategic depth viz-a-viz India. As Zahid Hussain opined that Pakistan support for 
the Taliban was certainly not based on any ideology, it purely reflected geo-strategic objectives. i.e a friendly or 
pliant government in Afghanistan (Hussain, Zahid, 2010,p. 30)  
 Since long Afghan Affairs had been in the domain of military and its allied organizations, but first time, 
after the capture of  Afghanistan by Taliban the civilian bureaucracy under the patronage of Naseer-Ullah-Babar, 
especially Afghan Trade Development Cell and civilian departments played a key role not only in decision 
making but remained active at operational level. Pakistan laid new telephone cables linking major cities of 
Pakistan to Turkmenistan. (Khalilzad, Zalmay. 1993, p. 193). Similarly, Kandahar and other cities of 
Afghanistan could be dialed by Quetta’s code 081. 
 1997-1999  
 After 39 days of Kabul capture, Benazir Bhutto’s government was over thrown on the charges of 
corruption, economic mismanagement and deteriorated law and order situation. President Leghari invoked 
Eighth amendment and in eight years, this was third government axed by this constitutional instrument. Nawaz 
Sharif became prime minister in 1997 with absolute majority. This was his second term in which he appeared to 
have been more inclined towards religious orthodoxy. (Hussain, Zahid). He showed his intention in echoing the 
Islamisation process of Zia’s period.  
 On April 1, 1997, the parliament unanimously passed the 13th amendment under which the power of 
president given by 8th amendment was eliminated.  The new amendment ascertained that the prime minister was 
to dismiss and appoint the chiefs of the Armed Services. Nawaz Sharif’s government was seemingly appeared 
less inclined to curb the activities of militants and Jihadi outfits beyond the borders. In his previous term, ISI had 
been blamed for being to be supportive to jihadist outfits in Kashmir. In 1992, The CIA Director wrote a letter to 
Nawaz Sharif in which he mentioned the possibility of declaring Pakistan a terrorist State on the basis to have 
been involved in providing material support by ISI.  He selected General Javed Nasir   as new ISI Chief in 1992. 
He had declared inclination towards Islamic renaissance. He had close links with Tablighi Jamaat. During his 
tenure, ISI moved independently undermining the Military’s control and command system. However, he had 
been removed from ISI right after the dismissal of Nawaz Shrif government in May 1993.( Hussian , Zahid, 
2007, p.27) . The same policy measure regarding Islamic outfits continued as written by Hussain Haqqani (2005) 
in his second term of office, “Official defence to the Jihadi groups was demonstrated by the visits in April 1998 
of the Governor of Punjab and the Pakistani Information Minister to the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. 
The Governor of Punjab applauded the spirit of Jihad and a sense of sacrifice among the students of the 
Markaz.(p. 299)  
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In August 1998, he introduced a bill in the National Assembly for the 15th amendment, which 
ultimately meant to declare Nawaz Sharif the Kalifa, the caliph. The bill passed on October   9 1998, but could 
not get assent of the senate. Eventually, Nawaz Sharif tried hard to mobilize the religious segment of society to 
mount pressure on Senate; but all went in vain. (Abbas, Hasan, 2005,p. 165). In a statement, Nawaz Sharif 
idealized the situation prevailing in Afghanistan. He stated, “I have heard that one can safely drive a vehicle full 
of gold at midnight without fear. I want this kind of system in Pakistan (Griffin, Michael, 2001, p. 203). This 
shows his ideological predisposition on matters related to Taliban regime at that time. However, until April 
1997, despite all successes of Taliban, Gohar Ayub Foreign Minister in a statement clarified that Pakistan had no 
immediate plans to recognize Taliban government. (Dawn April, 10, 1997)   
 In whole of May 1997, Taliban advances and capturing of province after one another remained 
continued. Taliban started their first North offensive in January 1997 (Dawn, January 25, 1997). Finally, in May 
1997 crushing all resistance and also by maneuvering alliances with Malik Pahalwan, the ex- ally of Malik 
Rashid Dostam made easy for Taliban to enter Mazar-e-Sharif, chanting slogan “Allah-o-Akbar. (Dawn, May 
25, 1997) 
 This was a tremendous victory and Pakistan next day of capture of Mazar-e-Sharif with all jubilation 
recognized Taliban government. Gohar Ayub Khan in a statement announced that new government in Kabul 
fulfilled all criteria for “de-jure recognition”. (Dawn, May 26, 1997) 
 The opposition leader chairperson of PPP endorsed the recognition of Taliban as de-Jure government, 
but she was very much concerned about the possibility of emergence of such elements in Pakistan (Dawn, May 
27, 1997). The UAE and Saudi Arabia also followed Pakistan and formally recognized Taliban regime. (Dawn, 
May 28, 1997) ISI’s role once again became very prominent when its officials mediated between Malik 
Pahalwan and Taliban to settle their issues on 28 May 1997, right after two days of Taliban capture of Mazar-e-
Sharif. The local population stood up against Taliban, consequently Taliban retreated losing five Northern 
provinces, which they occupied five days back. This encounter at Mazar-e-Sharif caused heavy atrocities as at 
least 2500  Taliban and approximately 10,000 Non-Pushtoons disappeared from the abandoned provinces of 
Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Badghis and Sowarngan. 
 Mullah Umer appealed to Pakistani Madrassas and almost 10,000 fighters cum students joined Taliban 
forces. (Dawn June 2, 1997) Pakistan’s civilian leadership during the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif regime 
persistently continued to extend all out support to Taliban. Pakistan provided 6000 tons of wheat to Taliban 
despite their inhumane attitude towards Hazarajat as they had enforced blockade on all the roads from the South 
West and East. This blockade starved at least one million people in Bamiayan, Ghor, and Wardak.  
 In the July 1998, Taliban once again moved to assault on North. This time Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s 
military establishment meaningfully supported Taliban with cash and Weapons. The Saudi intelligence Chief 
Prince Turki Al Faisal visited Kandahar and pledged to give them 400 picks up and substantial financial aid. 
Pakistan provided Rs. 10. Millions for road repairs in Kabul by Ambassador Aziz-Ud-Din Khan (Dawn July, 
1998).  
 There were reports that Pakistan’s ISI managed 2 billion PKR in terms of logistical support. Before the 
attack of Mazar-e-Sharif, There were reports that Pakistani officials had visited Taliban frequently. Abdul 
Rashid Dostam blamed that some 1500 Pakistan’s military personnel belonging to Elite Special Services Group 
with effective support of Pakistani piloted air attacks from Afghan air force fighter planes made possible the 
capture of Mazar-e-Sharif (Middle East International, August 21, 1998,pp. 13-14). Ahmed Shah accused that at 
least 28,000 military and Para Military staffs were used to consolidate the Taliban occupation (Griffin, Michael, 
2001,p. 208).  The ISI used Ex Afghan Army officers, affiliated with General Shah Nawaz Tani exiled in 
Pakistan since March 1990. He with the backing of ISI and Gulbadin Hikmatyar tried to coup against Najibullah 
but failed in his attempt. Tani had affiliation with Khalaq faction of PDPA. The Ethnic Pashtun identity led these 
ex-Afghan Army officers to help Taliban and ensure resurgence of Pushtun dominance in power structure of 
Afghanistan. Therefore, the Afghan Air force planes and a considerable portion of Armor and Artillery of 
Afghan Army helped Taliban.  
 By 1998, Pakistan in cognizance of significance of Taliban’s victory was seeing Taliban controlled 
areas as a sort of de facto expansion of its territory. The ISI established training camps secretly at Kabul, 
Jalalabad, Kandahar, Khoost and other adjacent areas to Pakistan for guerrillas to be used in disputed Kashmir. 
This policy was continuously pursued despite the Clinton administration’s retaliatory attack in 1998 on 
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Jalalabad, Khoost, Kandahar. Now one point agenda of hunting Osama bin Laden became the prime mover of 
US policy and gave a new turn to the events. 
 In 1999, Pakistan’s internal political scenario and external environment coincidently was marked by 
unparalleled events of history, which commenced in May 1998. India surprised the world by detonating five 
atomic devices at Pokharan. Pakistan pursued the same path and stepped in disregard of all types of pressure 
from international community. At domestic level, except from a small segment of moderate people from civil 
society, generally he received applause specifically from religious parties. These were more enthusiast than 
others to even the score with India. Similarly Islamic countries largely backed Pakistan decision of 28th May 
1998.  
 After eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation of previous year, a wind of change blew in South Asia in early 
1999 when friendship between India and Pakistan wrapped up the entire region. The reconciliation process 
culminated into engagement between both the countries at various levels, like Lahore Agreement 1999, Delhi-
Bus Service, launched by Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif, but soon dust storm of Kargil conflict changed the entire 
scenario. Pakistan initially termed this incursion an independent move of Kashmir freedom fighters. But India 
was fully convinced that Pakistan Army did this adventure in the name of Kashmir mujahedeen. Domestically, 
this adventure unleashed such consequences, which crystallized deeply ingrained facts of political system, first 
this widened the already existed chasm between military and elected leadership, secondly the primacy of military 
leadership in foreign policy decision making fully entrenched. However, military leadership had never acceded 
that civilian government was kept in darkness. They claimed that on January 29, 1999, and Feb 5, 1999 a 
comprehensive briefing was conducted for Nawaz Sharif explaining all the aspects of Kargil situation. Rather,  a 
good no of briefings had been  undertaken by DGISI and other relevant high officials regarding this issue. 
(Musharaf, Pervaiz, 1996, p. 96)  
 The third consequence was the non-acceptance by military leadership of the meddling of political 
leaders into internal affairs of Army and ISI. Lt General Tariq Pervaiz, a Quetta based corps commander and 
cousin of one of Nawaz Sharif’s Federal Minister had a meeting with PM without prior permission of COAS. He 
was right away removed from military service on this sheer violation of discipline.  Military top brass took it as 
an attempt to divide Military. (Baxter, p. 54-55)  All these events paved the way for coming monumental event 
of the removal of Nawaz Sharif from premiership. Nawaz Sharif did not allow Pervaiz Musharaf plane to land at 
Karachi Airport and simultaneously when he was in air,  was deposed from the seat  of COAS at 4:30 pm and Lt 
General Khawaja Zia-ud-din was declared  new COAS (Abbas, 2005, P.176). However, Army elite officers did 
not let civilian leaders to smart out them and lose their pedestal position in Pakistan. So they decided with 
immediate effect to rectify this situation. Army took over the control of Karachi Airport.  Musharaf plane safely 
landed. All of events ended in the removal of democratic elected government. (Siddqa, 2007,p. 96).  
 Army was once again in direct control of foreign policy making. On October 17, 1999 in a televised 
address to nation, He announced seven point agenda delineating his program to rebuild the national cohesion and 
strength of the federation.  He did not talk much about any change in foreign and defense policies of the country. 
He continued the previous government stance of supporting Taliban (Abbas, Hassan, 2005, p. 182).  
 In 1999, Pakistan was passing through by many worries and problems; prominent among them was the 
US concern over its persistent patronage of orthodox regime of Taliban, which by that time had virtually become 
base camp of al-Qaeda operations and sanctuary of thousands of Islamic militants from different countries. 
Pakistan military and civilian leaders were fully convinced that Pakistan’s policy was correct (Ahmed Rashid, 
2001, p. 194). However, the decision makers of Mushraf government realizing the significance of durable peace 
also showed interest in UN peace initiatives side by side also supported mediation measures taken by regional 
countries. As in a meeting with Turkmenistan foreign minister Pakistani foreign minister supported the efforts of 
group of six plus. (Dawn, January 27, 1999)  
 In the meantime, USA was also mounting pressure over Taliban regarding its demands to expel Osama 
Bin Ladan (Dawn, Feb 5, 1999).But Taliban were stick to their stance not to expel Osma Bin Laden from 
Afghanistan. They were not ready to undermine their Pakhtun - Wali, a strong usual norm of Pakhtun to give 
protection to a guest at any cost. (Dawn, February 10, 1999) Throughout 1999, Pakistan had been under fierce 
criticism for its Taliban policy. In August, the same year, the ousted President Rabhani wrote a letter to UN 
Security Council to take serious measures against Pakistan because of its interventionist designs against 
Afghanistan (Dawn, Aug, 6, 1999) 
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 PM Nawaz Sharif rejected this blame while presiding over the cabinet meeting as he said his 
government was not taking any “sides” in Afghanistan (Dawn, Aug 1999). In the last days, the USA successfully 
persuaded Nawaz Sharif to bring a change in his policy and urged him to use his influence as the mentor of 
Taliban to hand over Osama to USA. Nawaz Sharif, first time ever publically denounced Taliban. On 7 October 
1999, Lt General Zia-Ud-Din, chief of ISI went to Kandahar to see Mullah Umer with concrete evidences of 
training camps in use by militant organizations and religious militants who were involved in target killing of 
Shia community in Pakistan. The change in civilian leadership’s policy towards Taliban became more 
discernible when Nawaz Sharif in the same month flew to Dubai to brief the Gulf States about the change in 
policy. Nawaz Sharif insisted that Taliban should stop all activities in Pakistan and shut down all training camps. 
(Griffin, 2001, p. 233).  
 But soon he was deposed by military, eventually the forces who had been the real movers and shakers 
of Pakistan’s policies towards Kashmir and Afghanistan since 1980s once again were in the center stage. (Saikal, 
Amin in K. Wariko ed, p. 248) About Pervaiz Musharaf and his coterie, Selig  Harrison had the opinion, quoted 
in Griffin (2001,p. 232) “Musharaf  along with a number of other high ranking military staff also had ties with 
many of the Islamic fundamentalist groups that have had supported the Taliban.” 
 Conclusively it can be said that since long Pakistan was in the desire to curb all possibilities of 
resurgence of Pashtoon nationalism within Pakistan and along the border of Durand Line.  It was thought this 
could be done by only stopping Pashtoon nationalists coming into power in Afghanistan. Therefore, to achieve 
this motive, Islamic identity was invoked repeatedly (Resolving Afghan imbroglio, Dawn 6, 1999). This concept 
prevailed and the strategies followed remained more or less same throughout the history of Pakistan, specifically 
after 1970’s. 
 Pervaiz Musharaf initially seemed inclined to pursue the policy change, initiated by Nawaz Sharif in his 
last days. Pakistan played an intermediary role between the  US and Taliban to settle the issues, with partial 
success, when Taliban agreed to set up a commission to investigate about the Bin Laden involvement in 
bombing at US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. However, they were not responsive to any of 
Pakistan’s requests despite the fact that Pakistan stood by them, when they were in isolation because of their 
contrary stance to International community and annoyance of almost all regional countries Uzbekistan, Iran, 
Tajikistan etc. 
 Musharaf government in compliance to UN sanctions closed down branches of Afghan Banks in 
Pakistan and   frozen all bank accounts. (Pioneer 9, 12, 1999) Hamza Alvi (2002) has observed, “Musharaf 
himself does not appear to have been driven by any ideology. He is a professional. He has had no difficulty in 
abounding one policy and supporting another if that promises to be profitable.” (p, 26). With time, this opinion 
appeared very much true. By mid May 2000, Pervaiz Musharaf and his top confidant showed a bent of mind to 
support to Taliban against Northern Alliance, which by that time had become the blue-eyed boy of all regional 
countries including India and Iran. Pakistan has always remained obsessed with a desire to countervail India’s 
influence in the region.  
  Since 1980’s, Iran had also been a source of instability for Pakistan’s social fabric due to intrusive role 
in the affairs of Shia Sunni divide. (Nasar, S.V.R, 2002, p.88) Pakistan also wanted to curtail the influence of 
Iran in the region. Musharaf as written by Amin Saikal under the influence of the military and growing militant 
Islamic forces backed away from the original promise of pressuring the Taliban (In K. Warik: 248). In an 
interview to BBC on 2, August, 2000, he clearly expressed the change in his mindset, and he cleared that policy 
of supporting Taliban as being a cross border force dominated by ethnic Pashtuns who populate on both sides of 
the long Afghan Pakistan border would be continued. (ibid: 249).  
 Before 2001, Pakistan had full-fledged diplomatic contacts with the Taliban regime despite the 
international community consensus against them. Pakistan   pledged to continue its support to reconstruct the 
Afghanistan fragile economy (Raja, Zulfiqar, Sattar stresses talks for Afghan peace News, 25, Jan, 2000). In 
pursuance of this policy line, Pakistan extended operational assistance between May to October 2000. This 
support made possible the pincer movement of Taliban against Northern alliance. (Dawn January, 2000) 
 However, military in command of policymaking also simultaneously continued to urge Taliban to 
respond positively to international community concerns regarding Bin Laden issue. In this regard, a request was 
also made to Mullah Rabbani who was on a visit to Pakistan in those days. He did not show any flexibility on 
Osama’s issue. (Hindu, February, 22000). Taliban’s were steadfast with their stance throughout the year 2000 
with a plea that he was a guest (News, July 7, 2000). The development in Afghanistan regarding Buddah’s 
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destructions in Bamiyan, Ahmed Shah Masood’s successful visit to Europe in which he demanded from 
International community for diplomatic support Against Taliban, dragged Pakistan into a state of isolation. He 
also asked international community to pressurize Pakistan to end its assistance to Taliban. He said that without 
Pakistan’s support the Taliban’s military campaign would not even last a year. (Dawn April 7, 2001).  
 General Mahmod Ahmad one of the leading operates of the military bureaucratic structure at that time 
had a pronounced pro-Taliban stance. He, during his visits to USA once in April 2000 and then in September 
2001, elaborately defended Pakistan policy towards Taliban regime. During his second visit in Sep 2001, the 
tragic event of 9/11 occurred,   which qualitatively and paradigmatically changed the entire scenario of 
international environment, Pak-US relations, and Afghanistan alike. He came back with a list of demands, which 
he acceded even without consulting General Pervaiz Musharaf. However, he was overtly unhappy over the 
behavior of US officials after 9/11 and the way he had been pressed for the demands. (Hussain, Zahid, 2010, p. 
36)  
 All the successive events testified that crucial decisions in Pakistan have always, been taken by just a 
few people (power elite) of the society. Musharaf had a short deadline to reply to US demands, which had been 
already accepted by General Mahmmod Ahmed. He could not take in confidence the other corps commanders 
over the policy reversal. However, on September 14, 2001 nine corps commanders and other high officials at 
GHQs and chiefs of the ISI and MI had a meeting. Musharaf explained the reasons and causes of policy reversal 
and the circumstances in which Pakistan had to give in to American demands. He told them that Pakistan faced a 
stark choice it could either join the US coalition supported by the United Nations or otherwise be declared 
terrorist state, leading to severe economic sanctions. Musharaf found in this meeting a mixed response as 
dissident opinions came  from four corps commanders namely Lt General Aziz Lt General Muzaffar Usmani, 
Deputy Chief of Army Staff. General Mushtaq, Lt General Jamshed Gulzar. While General Mahmood kept quiet. 
(Abbas, Hassan, 2005, p. 220)  
 There were reports that at one hand, he acceded to the demands of the US and on  the other hand, he 
motivated Mullah Umer to remain steadfast and not to succumb to American pressure (Hussain, Zahid, 2010, p. 
42). Musharaf civilian co-aides readily accepted the U-turn in Pakistan’s policy towards Taliban but he had to 
shed off the burden off General Mahmood Ahmed and other dissidents. (Abbas, Hassan, 2005, p.220) 
 A delegation comprising Lt General Mahmood, the ISI chief, and Moulvi Nizamdin Shanzai head of the 
famous Deobandi Maddrasa in Binori town, Karachi went to the Taliban to convince them to handover Usama 
Bin Laden. But mission failed instead of convincing Mullah Umer, Mufti Shanzai encouraged Mullah Umer to 
start a Jihad against the United States if it attacks Afghanistan (Friday Times Oct. 07, 2001& Abbas Hassan, 
2005, p. 221) 
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